China's renewable energy development: policy, industry and business perspectives by Dent, Christopher
1 
 
China’s Renewable Energy Development: 
Policy, Industry and Business Perspectives 
 
Christopher M. Dent 
University of Leeds, c.m.dent@leeds.ac.uk  
 
Abstract: China has been at the forefront of the recent global expansion of renewable energy (RE) 
activity. This paper examines how the country has achieved its position as the world’s largest producer 
and exporter of RE products, and biggest power generator from renewables. More specifically, it 
explores the main motives driving renewable energy development in China, how this is embedded in 
broader new development thinking on realising ‘ecological civilisation’ goals, evolving government 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
The rapid expansion of renewable energy (RE) in China since over the last decade is 
of some considerable significance for understanding current and possible future 
thinking on the country’s economic, social and business development. Over time the 
Chinese government has afforded greater strategic priority to developing renewables 
as an energy sector and industry for three main reasons. First, China faces serious 
energy security challenges as burgeoning industrial-based development and rising 
material demands of business and society have intensified pressures on domestic 
energy reserves and raised dependency on foreign energy sources. China is now 
consequently one of the world’s largest energy importers. Second, RE technologies 
are being promoted for important environmental and welfare imperatives. High 
carbon economic activity is causing acute pollution and other environmental 
problems in the country, correspondingly leading to adverse social welfare effects. 
The ability of renewables to produce cleaner energy makes them a vital part of the 
solution to this problem and addressing climate change risk. Third, renewable energy 
sectors such as solar and wind are viewed as important emerging strategic industries 
by the Chinese government, forming part of its push to make the country an 
‘innovation hub’ economy as envisioned in the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015). 
Relatedly, renewable energy is a core element of the country’s new low(er) carbon 
development strategies and efforts on sustainable development generally. 
 
Renewable energy development in China should thus not be considered in isolation 
of broader development processes, strategies and contexts in which it is embedded. 
Thinking on China’s renewable energy development also combines ideas from 
ecological modernisation and strategic industry theories. This applies to both 
government policy and business practice. The landscape of China’s renewable energy 
business across different industry value-chains is characterised by dynamic 
entrepreneurism, inter-sectoral connections, a dense mix of state-owned enterprises 
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and private sector companies, intensifying competition and fast expanding 
production capacity. The relationship between government and business here is a 
complex and complicated one, yet this is to be expected in a large fast-growing 
economy where the state is proactively supporting the development of dynamic 
industries such as wind and solar energy.  
 
 
1.2 Research Methods and Questions 
 
Research undertaken for this work is of a qualitative political economy nature, 
drawing upon various types of analytical and information sources over a two-year 
period from October 2011 to November 2013. The empirical work is set within a 
theoretical-conceptual framework later defined in this study that helps provide 
deeper explanations on both the causes and consequences of China’s renewable 
energy development. The analysis addresses a number of research questions. It 
begins by asking what renewable energy is and why is it so important? These are the 
main research questions we have chosen, rather than straight hypotheses. 
Theoretical explanations for the rise of renewable energy are considered, and also 
what have been the main motives behind China’s renewable energy development. It 
also explores whether the Chinese government is pursuing a unique renewable 
energy policy and strategy, and how this may be different to other countries. In 
addition, what different patterns of Chinese business development have occurred in 
the country’s RE industries and what are the key issues arising in state–business 
relationships here? Further, what are some of the impacts that China is making 
globally on renewable energy business and industries? 
 
 
 
2. China and the Global Development of Renewable Energy 
 
2.1 What is Renewable Energy and Why is it Important? 
 
Renewable energy is derived from replenishable natural processes, sources or 
phenomena, such as wind, solar, geothermal, hydropower, tidal, and biological 
matter. They are ‘renewable’ because in actual or theoretical terms they can provide 
inexhaustible supplies of energy to meet the needs of humankind. In contrast, fossil 
fuels (coal, oil, natural gas) and nuclear (based on uranium) are non-renewable 
because their energy sources are ultimately exhaustible. Today, we often refer to 
renewables in terms of their technological applications, among the most common 
being wind turbines, solar photovoltaic (PV) modules or panels, tidal barrages, 
biofuels, and so on. These can vary enormously in terms of scale, for example from 
small solar photovoltaic cells that generate a few watts of electricity to power 
electronic devices such as calculators to huge hydropower plants such as China’s 22.5 
gigawatt (GW) capacity Three Gorges Dam, the world’s largest power station. 
Renewable energy is arguably the main element of a broader green energy cluster of 
technologies that additionally includes energy efficiency and saving, electric vehicles, 
fuel cells and other eco-industry sectors.  
 
Renewable energy technologies provide critically important options for China in 
meeting various development challenges that lie ahead but nevertheless come with 
their own environmental and socio-economic costs. The most controversial of all has 
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been the construction of numerous large hydroelectric dams that have caused 
destruction to local eco-systems and the relocation of millions of Chinese from their 
homes. The future development of large-scale tidal barrages could have similar 
adverse effects. More generally, renewable energy systems are in some way 
materially based, and require industrial processes to produce installation equipment. 
Consequently, no renewable energy technology is completely carbon neutral, or in an 
absolute pure sense completely ‘renewable’ as most of the materials on which they 
depend are depletable. Emissions from biomass and biofuel combustion can cause 
their own environmental problems. Some RE installations also require large areas of 
uninhabited space, such as wind farms and solar parks, presenting certain 
environmental, economic and spatial constraints. Notwithstanding these points, the 
ability of renewables to produce much cleaner and safer energy than fossil fuels or 
nuclear makes them essential to decarbonising economic activity, securing long-term 
energy futures, achieving sustainable development and tackling climate change. This 
is especially relevant to China given the country’s closely related economic, energy 
and environmental challenges it faces domestically and its impacts in these areas 
globally.  
 
 
2.2 The Global Rise of Renewables 
 
Renewable energy technologies have long been used by societies and civilisations 
around the world. In the modern era, hydroelectric dams have long been the 
dominant form of renewable energy installations generating utility-scale electricity, 
these dating back to the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Although the inclusion of 
hydropower in the renewables category remains controversial due the adverse 
ecological and socio-economic effects caused by large-scale dams locally, most 
analysts still consider it as a valid renewable energy sector, not least because of the 
recent growth of small-scale hydropower which is far less impactful. Other types of 
modern RE technology have been developed, many of which have been scaled up into 
mainstream industries (e.g. wind, solar) while others have remained low-level power 
producers like geothermal, tidal and concentrating solar power, with some still 
largely experimental, such as wave energy. 
 
It was not until the early 2000s that significant growth and development in 
renewables generally began as new RE technologies became gradually scaled up and 
approached commercialisation. Wind, solar and bioenergy deserve special mention 
here, and electricity generation is arguably where renewables have made the biggest 
impact on global energy systems. Worldwide renewable energy power capacity has 
risen from 931GW in 2005 to 1,473GW by 2012, which represents 26.0 percent of 
global total, leading in addition to a rising share of global electricity generation 
output from 15.6 percent to 21.7 percent. As Table 1 indicates, hydropower accounted 
for 16.5 percent of global electricity generation in 2012, this being around three-
quarters of the total renewables contribution. From 2005 to 2012, wind power 
installed capacity has increased from 59.0GW to 282.6GW, and solar PV from 
5.4GW to 102.1GW, the two fastest growing RE sectors. In terms of global primary 
energy demand, renewables accounted for 19.0 percent of the total in 2011, with 
traditional biomass being the most prominent RE sector (9.3 percent) and primarily 
related to cooking and heating in remote areas of developing countries. 
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Hydropower1 117,390    130,290    148,230    172,600    196,290    216,060    232,980    248,900    990,000          25.1       325GW, inc 41GW pumped storage (2015); 430GW (2020)
Wind 1,060         2,599         5,912         12,210      25,810      44,733      62,634      75,374      282,587          26.7       100GW, inc. 5GW offshore (2015); 200GW*, inc. 30GW offshore (2020)
Solar PV 0 80              100            145            373            893            3,093         8,300         102,156          8.1         39GW (2015); 47GW (2020)
Biomass 2,000         2,500         3,000         3,270         4,600         5,500         7,000         8,000         83,000            9.6         13GW (2015); 30GW (2020)
Geothermal 24              24              24              24              24              24              24              24              11,700            0.2         
Ocean (Tidal and Wave) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 527                  0.6         
Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,550              0.0 1GW (2015); 3GW (2020)
Renewable Energy total 120,477 135,496 157,269 188,252 227,100 267,213 305,734 340,601 1,472,520      23.1       
% share total installed capacity 23.0 22.0 22.0 23.0 25.0 26.0 28.5 29.6
% share total power output generated 16.0 15.0 15.0 17.0 17.0 18.0 16.0 20.0
Nuclear 6,850 6,850 8,850 8,850 9,080 10,820 12,570 13,800 364,078          3.8         40GW (2015); 58GW (2020)
% share total installed capacity 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
Other Energy Production 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Solar water heaters (million m2) 80.0 90.0 108.0 136.0 160.0 185.0 217.4 257.7 400 million m2 (2015)
Biogas users (million households) 18.1 21.8 26.2 30.5 35.1 39.0 43.0 _ 50 million households (2015)
Solid biomass (1,000 tonnes) 0 0 30 1,000 2,000 3,000 3,500 6,000 10 million tonnes (2011-2015)
Bioethanol (1,000 tonnes) 1,020 1,020 1,290 1,580 1,720 1,860 1,900 2,000 4 million tonnes (2011-2015)
Biodiesel (1,000 tons) 50 50 100 300 500 500 400 500 1 million tonnes (2011-2015)
Sources: BP (2013), CNREC (2013),  EPIA (2013), GWEC (2013), REN21 (2013).
Notes: 1. includes pumped storage. General: data source figures differ for China's installed wind, solar PV and geothermal energy capacity. The author has chosen to use international sourced data from international sectoral and other organisations (GWEC, EPIA, REN21, BP) for these sectors 
for international comparative reasons over Chinese national data, which is generally believed to under-estimates capacity levels. * Unofficial government target.
Table 1   China's Renewable Energy Profile
Installed capacity, MWPower Generation Sector targets
Global 
installed 
capacity, MW 
(2012)
China % 
share of 
global 
total
110-120MW (2015) geothermal and tidal; 50MW ocean (2015)
 Non-fossil fuel (inc. nuclear): primary energy 11.4% (2015), 15% (2020); electricity 
generation capacity 30% (2015) 
 
 
China has been at the forefront of this global expansion of renewable energy. For a 
number of years its power generation capacity has been far greater than any other 
nation, having almost tripled from 122GW in 2005 to reach 341GW by 2012: the next 
ranked countries that year were the US (164GW), Germany (76GW), India (67GW) 
and Japan (59GW). Admittedly, China’s dominant position owes much to a large and 
still expanding hydropower programme yet even if this sector was excluded, China 
would still be ranked first globally with 92GW and the US second with 86GW 
(REN21 2013). Furthermore, China has been responsible for adding around 40 
percent of new additions to global renewable energy capacity since the late 2000s 
(REN21 2006, 2013).  
 
 
2.3 Theoretical Explanations 
 
Much of the academic literature examining the recent growth of renewables is 
located in energy science-engineering fields where development is studied from 
primarily a technical perspective and focused on new technological advances. Social 
science explanations on the subject from the relevant disciplines of political 
economy, business studies and sociology have tended to explain the rise of 
renewables from one of two main theoretical approaches, both of which situate 
renewable energy development in broader development contexts. 
 
The first of these is ecological modernisation theory (EMT), which first emerged in 
the early 1980s (Huber 1982, Jänicke 1984). This essentially is premised on the idea 
that sustainable development can be achieved through continual reform, 
modification and adaptation of existing economic and business structures. As York 
and Rosa (2003) succinctly summarise: “Central to [ecological modernisation 
theory] EMT is the view that… industrialization, technological development, 
economic growth, and capitalism are not only potentially compatible with ecological 
sustainability but also may be key drivers of environmental reform” (pg. 274). From 
this perspective, renewable energy is viewed as providing technical solutions to 
sustainable development challenges facing humanity. Despite criticisms made of 
EMT for prescribing incremental rather than revolutionary change, it remains the 
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dominant discourse among key decision-makers in both government and business 
circles regarding environment-related policies. An important reason for this is the 
appealing economic case it makes on how companies can increase profitability by 
pursuing green corporate strategies, through for instance improving material 
efficiency and waste management, and exploiting the emerging market potential of 
environmentally friendly products such as renewables (Christoff 1996, Jänicke 
1988). EMT postulates that economic and business growth is reconcilable with 
resolving environmental problems, and firms can generate financial gains through 
adopting new environmental technologies and practices (Langhelle 2000, Weale 
1992).  
 
Founded on closely related theories of industrial policy, strategic trade and state 
capacity, strategic industry theory is the second broad social sciences approach that 
can explain renewable energy development. It essentially concerns the state’s 
promotion of industries deemed essential to the nation’s long-term economic 
security, welfare and prosperity. The theory’s main premises are based on public 
good and externality arguments. While the market mechanism can account for the 
‘private’ and purely price-determined costs and benefits arising from economic 
transactions, it can fail to capture their external ‘social’ costs and benefits. Public 
actions undertaken by the state are thus required in such circumstances to both 
minimise negative externalities and properly capture or optimise positive 
externalities. Thus, state policies and investments in renewable energy installations 
and technologies will reduce carbon emissions, lead to cleaner air, and mitigate 
society’s supply risk dependency on exhaustible fossil fuel resources. These state 
actions constitute the provision of public goods where the market (i.e. private 
enterprise) alone is unable to independently and sufficiently deliver these welfare-
enhancing outcomes, and more broadly placing the economy and society on track to 
a lower carbon future. Left purely to the market, many RE sectors would not become 
technologically developed enough or adequately commercialised to compete on price 
with fossil fuel generated energy.  
 
Strategic industry theory further makes a case for state support towards covering the 
proportionately high initial capital costs (e.g. infrastructure, new technology 
research) arising at the early development stage of emerging strategic industries with 
significant futures based on the expectation of substantial long-term returns on this 
state investment for the economy and public welfare (Lall 2003; Rodrik 2004, 2007; 
Schmitz 2007). The theory has had a particularly strong influence on development 
thinking in China and other East Asian states, as clearly demonstrated in their 
macro-development plans in which fostering emerging strategic industries 
constitutes a core programmatic element. Where the government seeks more direct 
involvement in strategic industry development it will form new or encourage existing 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to play an active part in meeting plan objectives. In 
addition, the government will look to develop close relationships with business 
enterprises generally through using a comprehensive range of policy mechanisms. 
Ecological modernisation also highlights the importance of state policies and 
institutions in helping markets and paths of economic development evolve towards 
more environmentally friendly outcomes.  
 
 
2.4 China’s Renewable Energy Development 
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2.4.1 Power Generation and Energy Production Overview 
 
As Table 1 shows, hydropower has clearly dominated China’s renewable energy 
development over time, this being broadly consistent though with international 
norms. The government has targets to increase power capacity levels in this 
essentially state-run industry to 325GW by 2015 under the 12th Five-Year Plan, and 
then to 430GW by 2020 under its medium to long-term renewable energy strategy. 
This is primarily based on the further construction of large hydroelectric dams, the 
country’s programme for which is the world’s largest (IHA 2013). Meanwhile, 
China’s installed wind energy capacity industry has expanded dramatically since the 
mid-2000s to reach 75.4GW by 2012, and further rapid growth is planned in 
accordance to government targets. The country’s fastest growing sector however is 
solar photovoltaic (PV), increasing over 100-fold since 2006 to reach 8.3GW by 
2012. China’s biomass power generation sector has meanwhile experienced steady 
growth, rising to 8.0GW installed capacity by the same year. These four sectors – 
hydropower, wind, solar PV and biomass – are responsible for virtually all the 
country’s power generation from renewables. A further four sectors make an 
extremely minor contribution: geothermal is a relatively mature technology industry 
that has grown very slowly worldwide. Tidal energy and concentrating solar power 
are both still infant micro-sectors but with considerable potential for future market 
and industry growth. As earlier indicated, wave energy technology remains at the 
experimental stage with no installed capacity yet worldwide. Even in these very small 
sectors the Chinese government has set relatively ambitious targets for future 
development, as it has for all RE sectors (Table 1). Together, all renewable energy 
sectors accounted for 29.6 percent of China’s electricity generation capacity by 2012, 
a share of the total that has gradually risen since the late 2000s.  
 
National power generation capacity in total has increased almost 10-fold over the last 
two decades or so, from 126.6GW in 1990 to 1,150.5GW by 2012, and most of this can 
be attributed to a rapidly growing coal power sector. This contributed to 758.0GW 
(66.0 percent) of total generation capacity in 2012, three times that of hydropower, 
while the fast growing gas sector had reached 38.1GW. Under the 12th FYP period 
(2011-2015) is a programme to develop 16 large coal-power bases in the north and 
northwest provinces, where the bulk of China’s coal deposits are situated, that will 
increase coal power capacity by 33 percent by 2015 (Yang and Cui 2012).  
 
 
2.4.2 Main Motive Factors for China 
 
There have been three main motives that have driven the expansion of renewable 
energy in China, the first being important environmental and welfare imperatives. 
High carbon economic activity is causing acute pollution and other environmental 
problems in the country, correspondingly leading to adverse social welfare effects. 
China overtook the United States in 2006 as the world’s biggest carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emitter. Latest available figures show that by 2009 China’s annual CO2 emissions 
level was estimated at 7,687 million tonnes, around a quarter of the global total. This 
has been principally driven by the country’s burgeoning demand for fossil fuel energy 
that is thought to have increased between five to six-fold since 1990 (Zhao and Yin 
2011). Two key points should be made here. A significant degree of China’s energy 
demand derives from the carbon-intensive manufacturing operations of foreign 
investor firms that have been relocated from their originating countries (mainly from 
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Europe, Japan and North America), thus helping them reduce their own carbon 
emissions. This carbon-intensive activity hosted by China serves the world market: 
foreign invested enterprises account for around 60 to 70 percent of the country’s 
exports. One could therefore argue that China’s high carbon emission levels are as 
much a product of global capitalism as national economic development. 
Furthermore, China’s energy demand is in a functional relationship with realising 
important domestic policy goals. Many communities in the nation’s more remote 
interior provinces either have inadequate electricity supply or none at all. 
Strengthening the national grid in these areas is integral to achieving the Chinese 
government’s overarching twin socio-economic objectives of closing income gaps 
within the country and lifting further hundreds of millions of its people out of 
poverty. The provision of key welfare services (health, education, utilities like 
freshwater supply) all depend on electricity supply, whether grid-connected or off-
grid generated. In sum, China’s power needs over the next few decades will be far 
greater than any other nation. 
 
Rising fossil fuel consumption is nevertheless causing significant environmental and 
welfare degradation in China. The government’s ambitious strategy for expanding 
coal-power capacity locks the country into a high emissions trajectory for decades to 
come, unless both clean coal and carbon capture and storage technologies make 
considerable advances in the future. Chinese cities are already among the world’s 
most polluted. The China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and 
Development (CCICED 2012) reported that in the year 2000 almost 300 people per 
million population were dying in China due to high emission particulate levels, the 
world’s highest rate, and this was expected to rise to almost 900 per million by 2030, 
placing the country even further ahead of other parts of the world. Many parts of 
China are also highly vulnerable to the climate change risks of extreme weather and 
rising sea-levels. The nation’s burgeoning middle class is correspondingly becoming 
more politically vocal about quality of life issues, such as pollution abatement. 
 
The second main motive behind China’s push for renewables is energy security, 
which can be understood generally as addressing supply risk, price risk and 
environmental risk, this last aspect already discussed above. In relation to the first 
two risk types, sustained high growth rates in energy demand is rapidly depleting 
China’s own fossil fuel deposits. It is the world’s second largest oil and coal importer, 
and the fourth largest importer of liquefied natural gas (BP 2013, Yang and Cui 
2012). Concerning nuclear, the country possesses only an estimated 1 percent of 
global uranium reserves, currently maintains a 65 percent import dependency on the 
mineral and has seen its uranium import levels triple from 2009 to 2011. Analysts 
expect China to overtake the US as the world’s largest uranium importer by 2020 
(Massot and Chen 2013). Although its energy import dependency ratio overall is not 
high by most international comparisons (9 percent in 2010) this is set to rise 
inexorably in the future, consequently making China more susceptible to the 
vicissitudes of foreign supply sources (Dent 2013). This is potentially further 
compounded by volatility in international prices for oil, gas and coal. Renewables 
have the advantage of being inherently indigenous energy sources, thus providing a 
long-term solution to foreign energy supply risk. Although some RE sectors are 
prone to occasional spikes in commodity price levels (e.g. polysilicon and solar PV 
cell manufacturing), they have been historically less exposed to price risk than fossil 
fuel sectors. The third main motive can be linked directly to strategic industry theory. 
Renewables are seen by China and most other countries as emerging strategic 
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industries. The rationale for government support of their development was 
previously made. 
 
 
 
3. China’s Renewable Energy Policies and Strategies 
 
3.1 Renewables as part of a New Development Approach 
 
Renewable energy development in China cannot be considered in isolation of the 
broader development processes, strategies and contexts in which it is embedded. The 
government’s more substantial promotion of renewable energy and national business 
growth of RE sectors over the last decade or so has occurred during a phase when 
China’s leaders have adopted new approaches and thinking on national economic 
and social development generally (CCICED 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011, 2012; NDRC 
2006; 2007b; 2011). Soon after assuming power, President Hu Jintao proclaimed the 
‘scientific development concept’ would form the new ideological basis for China’s 
future economic and social development, formally ratified into the national 
constitution at the 17th Party Congress in October 2007. One of its core aims was to 
foster a resource-saving and environment-friendly ‘harmonious society’, and 
“developing the economy in a more balanced manner, paying less attention to gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth per se and more attention to such things as the 
ecological costs of the headlong rush for development” (Fewsmith 2008: 88). This 
new vision for China’s development connected especially with the first identified 
motive (environmental and sustainable development imperatives) driving the 
promotion of renewable energy, and the government’s five-year plans and associated 
strategic development programmes reflected this shift towards more qualitative 
development objectives. 
 
The 11th FYP (2006-2010) was the first to do so, and it was also during this time that 
ideas on ecological modernisation were beginning to influence Chinese policy-
makers. In the year 2007, three key inter-related events reflected new development 
thinking in China: the Chinese Academy of Sciences published its inaugural China 
Modernization Report 2007: Study on Ecological Modernization, and the 
government launched its first National Climate Change Strategy as well as its 
Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy, also the first of 
its kind and that introduced a substantive strategic industry development 
programme for renewables. The convergence of ecological modernisation and 
strategic industry thinking was even more clearly evident in the overarching aims of 
the current 12th FYP (2011-2015). As well as aiming to achieve more equitable income 
growth, promote domestic consumption, improve social infrastructures and 
strengthen China’s innovatory capabilities, a prime focus of the 12th FYP was to 
promote lower carbon development (NDRC 2011). The stronger ecological 
modernisation approach to China’s future development was re-affirmed at the 18th 
Party Congress held in November 2012 when Hu Jintao announced the goal of 
building an ‘ecological civilisation’ and “achieve lasting and sustainable development 
of the Chinese nation” (address to the 18th Party Congress, 8 November 2012). 
 
 
3.2 Is China’s Approach to Renewable Energy Development Different? 
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By early 2013, 127 countries worldwide had introduced RE policy support 
mechanisms (up from just 55 countries in 2005) and 138 countries had set defined 
renewable energy targets. RE policy instruments come in various forms but may be 
generally categorised as follows: 
 
 Regulatory mandates: establishing legally binding requirements on firms to 
undertake particular action, such as renewable portfolio standards.  
 Direct financial support: such as state subsidies, grants, loans, and capital 
investment in RE sector plants and infrastructure.  
 Market-based instruments: adapting or using the market mechanism to 
provide a variety of different financial incentive measures, for example tax 
incentives, feed-in tariff systems, competitive bidding, and tradable permits. 
 
Considerable convergence has occurred internationally around the utilisation of 
similar policy instruments, such as feed-in tariffs (FiT) where the government offers 
price-based incentives to individuals and companies to install and operate renewable 
energy equipment. By early 2013, 71 countries and 28 sub-national states around the 
world had enacted FiT legislation, where in China it has proved a significant spur to 
business growth and investment in renewables from small to larger scale 
installations. China is also among the 22 countries to have introduced renewable 
portfolio standard (RPS) that mandate energy suppliers to source minimum quota 
levels of electricity generation from renewable energy systems.  
 
Developed economies and larger emerging economies, such as China, tend to have 
comprehensive RE policies that include a mix of regulatory mandate, direct financial 
support and market-based mechanisms. The application and balance of these will 
depend on the development stage of the renewable energy sector in question and the 
prevailing political economy of the country. Generally speaking, market-liberal 
country governments unsurprisingly have a special predilection for market-based 
instruments whereas more state-directed economy governments have more 
frequently deployed direct financial support policies. The latter is not just relevant to 
China but also many other East Asian economies with strong state capacity traditions 
(e.g. South Korea, Malaysia) and where SOEs play an important role in the energy 
sector. East Asian states have additionally demonstrated a proclivity for substantive 
strategic long-term planning on renewable energy development, this being arguably 
more evident in the region than any other (Dent 2012). What makes China most 
notably different, though, from all other countries is the absolute scale on which its 
policies, strategies and investment (both public and private) is facilitating renewable 
energy development, particularly regarding installed capacity and equipment 
manufacture, and in the prospective future on efficiency performance and techno-
innovation. The relationship between government and business in China’s RE 
industries is also rather uniquely complex due to the sheer density of state and 
corporate actors, the burgeoning expansion of business activity and issues of policy 
co-ordination involving multiple state agencies. 
 
China’s hydropower policies date back many decades but it was not until the 1990s 
that the government started to pursue a multi-sector renewable energy policy. The 
1995 China Electric Power Act was the country’s first legislation to call for the 
promotion of renewables generally. This was soon followed by the first specific RE 
10 
 
policy landmark with full legal status, the 1996 Brightness Programme, located in the 
9th FYP (1996-2000) and based on approximately US$1.2 billion public investment 
to install hydropower, solar PV and wind energy facilities in over 1,000 townships 
and villages in rural communities. Soon thereafter a series of direct financial support 
measures were introduced in the 10th FYP (2001-2005) period. The 10th FYP 
proclaimed that production capacities in the wind, solar and geothermal energy 
sectors should be increased but did not set specific development targets (NDRC 
2001, NREL 2004). These came later when renewables became priority emerging 
strategic industries. The 2003 Wind Power Concession Programme included plans to 
create up 20 large wind farms of 100-200MW capacity and the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) correspondingly set China’s first 
national target of reaching 20GW of wind energy capacity by 2020.  
 
The introduction of the Renewable Energy Law (REL) in 2006 at the eve of the 11th 
FYP proved critical to expanding and diversifying renewables development. It 
created a far more robust legislative basis for business investment and established 
national standards for RE technologies and production (NEB 2008). This was 
complemented by the Medium and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable 
Energy, implemented from September 2007. The Plan set out China’s ambitious 
targets for multi-sector renewable energy development to 2020 and backed up with 
US$263 billion of public investment. Even greater government stimulus was 
provided in the 12th FYP (2011-2015) that included a RMB4 trillion (US$610 billion) 
funded programme to promote seven Strategic Emerging Industries (SEI) for ‘clean’ 
development and a ‘new industry base’, namely: new energy, new generation ICT, 
energy-saving and environment protection, biotechnology, high-end equipment, new 
materials and alternative energy cars. Renewables are specified as a key component 
of the ‘new energy’ SEI sector that in addition included nuclear power. Under the SEI 
programme, China plans to enhance its new technological and innovation 
capabilities in wind energy and solar PV as part of a broader strategy of transforming 
China from a ‘world factory’ into an ‘innovative hub’ economy. The 2012 Energy 
Policy White Paper reaffirmed the government’s commitment to vigorously develop 
renewables as “a key strategic measure for promoting the multiple and clean 
development of energy, and fostering emerging industries of strategic importance” 
(State Council of China 2012: 11). 
 
In the 12th FYP period to date, China’s renewable energy policy has intensified with 
an increasing number of initiatives and regulations introduced in order to keep pace 
with business and industry growth, and deal with challenges arising from it (CNREC 
2013). These include problems arising with gaps in grid connectivity and other 
infrastructural bottlenecks, establishing up-to-date technical standards, co-
ordinating central and local government policy concerning regional RE business 
development, and establishing clearer demarcations of responsibility among various 
actors in different renewable energy systems. It is beyond the scope of this study to 
explore these issues in great detail but some will be examined in discussions that 
follow on state-business relationships in China’s RE industries. 
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4. Implications 
 
4.1 Overview 
 
From the early 2000s to early 2010s, China has made the transition from being a net 
importer of renewable energy products to the world’s largest manufacturer and 
exporter of them, and the largest investor in RE plant development. In addition to its 
dominant position in the global hydropower industry, the country now produces 
around two-thirds of solar PV equipment (up from just 5 percent in 2004), four-
fifths of solar water heaters and almost half of wind turbines worldwide (EPIA 2013, 
REN21 2013, GWEC 2013). The burgeoning growth of national RE production and 
installed generation capacity has been driven by rising public and private sector 
investment. In 2005, China invested US$5.8 billion in renewable energy rising to 
US$66.6 billion by 2012, almost twice that for the United States (US$36.4 billion) 
and not far behind Europe’s combined figure of US$79.9 billion (REN21 2013). 
China’s state-owned enterprises play a very active role in national renewable energy 
development. These can be generally categorised as large-scale central government 
administered corporations or smaller local government-owned companies serving 
the energy needs of city municipalities and individual provinces. Examples of the 
former include the two state-owned grid companies that monopolise China’s 
electricity grids, the government’s five power generation companies (e.g. Guodian, 
Huadian) and national energy companies, e.g. Sinopec and SinoHydro. Naturally, 
both SOE types have close relationships with governing state agencies responsible for 
central and local government RE policy, although they can exercise high degrees of 
corporate autonomy and moreover compete among each other. Just as renewable 
energy sectors vary significantly from each other, so there are there many differences 
in the types of enterprises and markets that exist across them. Broadly speaking, an 
energy industry value-chain can be divided into the following elements, upstream to 
downstream: 
 
 Fuel source explorers or surveyors 
 Equipment manufacturers (including upstream suppliers) 
 Source or plant developers 
 Energy infrastructure providers 
 Plant or system maintainers 
 Retail market suppliers 
 
Coal, Oil, Gas Nuclear Hydropower Wind Solar PV Biomass
Fuel source explorers or surveyors Public Public  Public  Public / Private  Public / Private  Public / Private 
Equipment manufacturers (plus 
upstream suppliers)
Public / Private  Public / Private  Public / Private  Private  Private  Private 
Source or plant developers Public Public Public Public  Public / Private  Public 
Energy infrastructure providers Public Public Public Public Public  Public 
Plant or system maintainers Public Public Public Public  Public / Private  Public / Private 
Retail market suppliers Public Public Public Public
Public, n/a 
prosumers
Public
Table 2   Energy Enterprises in Power Generation (Public / Private sector mix in China)
Source: authors research.
Note: For the public / private sector mix in China status for each segment, 'Public / Private' indicates a situation where neither sector dominates. 'Public' or 'Private' indicates a situation where either correspondingly dominates. Private 
can also include foreign firms, such as hydropower turbine manufacturers
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Table 2 provides a comparative overview of how these differ across fossil fuel, 
nuclear and renewable energy sectors, also indicating the mix of Chinese public and 
private sector enterprises that exist in each part of the matrix. As indicated, SOEs 
dominate along the whole value-chain of China’s ‘incumbent’ fossil fuel, nuclear and 
hydropower sectors and many RE industry aspects. Li (2013) reports that by 2011 
there were some 700 SOEs involved for example in wind farm plant development. 
The country’s five government power generation companies alone were responsible 
for installing 57.0 percent of wind energy generation and local SOEs another 22.4 
percent. This contrasted with just 4.6 percent for China’s private wind farm 
developers, 1.3 percent for foreign firms and 14.7 percent for foreign joint venture 
projects. A similar situation exists at the plant development level in the biomass 
power generation industry. However, the solar PV industry is different due to its 
highly ‘distributed’ nature (i.e. multitudinous building-integrated installations) that 
has allowed a growing number of private sector firms over time to enter various 
aspects of the value-chain. The wider deployment of micro-scale RE technology 
applications generally – roof-top PV, small wind turbines, biomass boilers, pico-
hydro devices, etc – has created ‘prosumer’ individuals and organisations (including 
firms) that both produce and consume their own generated electricity and thermal 
power by and large independently, thus diminishing the need for energy supply 
companies. However despite the rapid growth of PV prosumers in China, utility-scale 
solar park capacity has grown even faster and is now presenting opportunities for 
energy SOEs to become market players here also (IEA 2013). In general, the 
country’s established energy SOEs with roots in fossil fuels, nuclear and hydropower 
have simply diversified into wind, solar, biomass and other renewables by applying 
their economies of scope advantages of existing technical expertise and assets to 
these new emerging power sectors. China’s public and private sector enterprises have 
in addition become more vertically integrated up and down industry value-chains. 
Below are some illustrative examples of the above points: 
 
 Deploying its marine engineering expertise, national oil company CNOOC has 
developed offshore wind projects, as well on onshore wind farms, biomass 
generation plants and biofuel production. Other major state-owned oil 
companies, Sinopec and CNPC, have too become scaled up biofuel producers. 
 Hydropower SOEs SinoHydro Group, and HydroChina Corporation and China 
Three Gorges Corporation have engaged in wind farm development, the latter 
two enterprises in overseas projects, e.g. in Pakistan. Shenhua Group, the 
world’s largest coal company, and China Guangdong Nuclear Power are also 
among China’s major wind farm developers. 
 China’s largest wind farm developer is Longyuan Power Group, a subsidiary of 
power generation SOE China Guodian Corporation. Longyuan is also involved 
in developing solar, biomass, geothermal and tidal energy projects. 
 Sinovel, originally an SOE then turned private enterprise from 2011, is China’s 
largest wind turbine manufacturer and additionally has operations in wind-
field design and planning, equipment transportation and installation, plant 
maintenance and remote data analysis services. 
 In June 2013 private wind turbine manufacturer Mingyang Wind Power 
formed a joint venture with state-owned China National Nuclear Corporation 
to develop wind farm projects in Henan province. 
 Hong Kong based GCL Poly, the world’s largest producer of polysilicon, the 
base material for mainstream solar PV cells, has recently ventured 
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downstream into wafer manufacture, and is also developing the 300MW 
Datong solar park that when constructed will be the world’s largest. 
 
In many other countries, fossil fuel companies are also major players in developing 
clean energy systems. However, it is the scale on which this business diversification 
is occurring in China’s energy companies that is somewhat exceptional. Their 
evolutionary transformation of into eventually green energy businesses, if this indeed 
transpires, is likely to prove a very slow process through gradual adaptations in 
response to changing technological, market and policy conditions. Yet this is 
consistent with the ecological modernisation approach. Government regulatory 
mandates will in the meantime require Chinese companies to source more power 
generation from renewables. In general the country’s larger incumbent, and mainly 
SOE companies have most successfully diversified and thrived in most aspects of 
China’s RE industry primarily due to economies of scale and scope advantages, and 
being well positioned to benefit from state support due to close connections with 
government ministries. There are additionally some interesting market dynamics at 
play. For instance, wind power generators rarely compete against coal-power 
generators as they are invariably the same companies. There exists intra-company 
competition between old and new energy divisions, China’s hydropower companies 
may take a competitive position against their fossil fuel rivals, and the country’s five 
large state-owned power generating companies compete against their local-level 
counterparts, but as they are all SOEs this may be considered an intra-state 
competition of sorts. 
 
Indeed, intra-state competition and tensions have had a profound impact on China’s 
renewable energy business on various levels, this proceeding from governance and 
co-ordination challenges involving central government, local government, SOEs and 
private companies. On the retail side, competing SOEs provide the main bulk of 
electricity sold to consumers (Table 2) at prices regulated locally but in accordance to 
centralised NDRC guidelines, yet a significant lack of transparency persists on both 
price formulation and the allocation of retail market contracts among enterprises 
(Lin and Purra 2012). Furthermore, as Shi (2013: 8) observed that local governments 
in China were often encouraging the development of RE plants to help meet their 
economic growth targets, more specifically arguing that: “The construction of power 
plants is mainly for increasing GDP rather than meeting the demands for electrical 
power, leading to serious blind construction of power plants in various areas”. 
Applying this to the wind energy industry, plant developer companies such as 
Longyuan have built numerous wind farms that may take a considerably long time 
before they are connected to the grid, explaining why by the early 2010s an estimated 
fifth of China’s wind power installations were in effect dormant. Contestations over 
grid connectivity and market demarcations among mainly power generation SOEs, 
grid infrastructure SOEs, local energy SOEs, local government and central 
government has created a difficult business environment in many aspects of this 
industry (GWEC 2013, Li 2013), and to some extent in the smaller solar PV power 
generation sector (CPIA 2013). Notwithstanding these problems, these industries 
continue to demonstrate robust growth. 
 
Table 2 shows that the only element of the value-chain where the private sector 
dominates in China’s RE industries (except hydropower) is in equipment 
manufacture. Wind energy companies such as Goldwind, Sinovel, Mingyang, United 
Power and Dongfang have all become key global players in their industry, as have 
14 
 
Yingli, JA Solar, Suntech and Trina in the PV sector. Although some of these firms 
once had SOE origins (e.g. Sinovel, Goldwind), the rapid expansion of this value-
chain element is a critically important part of China’s renewable energy development 
story. In 2004, the country had just six wind turbine firms, rising to 40 by 2007 and 
to around 90 by 2011 (Li 2013). Best estimates suggest over 400 solar PV 
manufacturers now operate in China (IEA 2013). There has been a dynamic 
entrepreneurial response generally from the nation’s public and private business 
sectors to the government’s strengthening policy support and ambitious strategic 
planning on renewables. However, the rapidly increasing number of RE equipment 
producers has created overcapacity problems in wind and solar PV most notably, this 
also having a significant global impact. Despite that in 2012 alone around 50 solar 
PV manufacturers filed for bankruptcy in China – five times the number of their 
European rivals – the country continued to expand PV production capacity (9.5 
percent growth in module output in 2012) as surviving companies take a positive 
view on long-term market growth and strong government support for the sector 
(CPIA 2013).  
 
Most recently, the government has incentivised the growth of domestic PV 
installations after the sharp fall in Western market demand, and state-owned banks 
have also provided assistance during these upheavals, for instance lending the 
nation’s top ten PV firms a combined US$20 billion in 2012 (REN21 2013). Current 
structural changes are likely to make China’s solar PV manufacturing industry far 
more concentrated as small-scale producers either go bust or are taken over, and 
SOEs also extend their interests into this value-chain element (Solidiance 2013). We 
may additionally expect greater further vertical integration in China’s wind and solar 
PV sectors as enterprises seek to diversify and consolidate their competitive 
positions. Here we see a convergence of interest between the Chinese government 
and energy companies towards achieving yet greater scale advantages in both power 
generation and equipment manufacture, making China even more price competitive 
in international markets. 
 
Western criticism of the Chinese government’s strategic industry support of its RE 
enterprises has led to intensifying trade disputes over solar PV equipment and wind 
turbines in particular. On the other hand, downstream firms in these industries 
worldwide (e.g. installation and maintenance companies) have welcomed China’s 
mass production of affordable renewable energy goods, and have lobbied against the 
application of US and EU trade restrictions on Chinese imports. Whatever transpires 
on the trade diplomacy front, China’s government and companies share a similar 
strategic vision of strengthening domestic techno-innovatory capacity in renewable 
energy industries. This is consistent with the 12th FYP’s core development objective of 
transforming the country into an ‘innovative hub’ economy, and Chinese company 
strategies of competing increasingly on technological terms and not just price.  
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The environmental and welfare costs of China’s high carbon activity are mounting. In 
acknowledgment of this, the government has endeavoured to establish a new 
development approach influenced by ecological modernisation thinking that seeks to 
reconcile these core objectives. This has combined with strategic industry theory 
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ideas on state proactivity on supporting the development of renewables as key 
emerging industries of the future. Over time, the Chinese government has gradually 
strengthened its renewable energy policies and strategies that are in turn embedded 
in larger policies and strategies that aim to foster greener, cleaner economic and 
business development. It has been shown how various types of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) still dominate most aspects of China’s renewable energy 
industries. This has made it often difficult to identify where the demarcations of state 
and business lie. One could make a case for considering SOEs themselves as a form 
of policy instrument, or at least an extension of China’s RE policy. Yet intense 
business competition also exists among these public enterprises. Overall, China’s 
renewable energy business landscape is highly complex, and can be generally 
characterised by dynamic public and private sector entrepreneurism, strong inter-
sectoral connections that extend to fossil fuel and nuclear power industries, a dense 
mix of SOEs and private companies, intensifying business competition at multiple 
levels, and fast expanding production capacity based on optimistic expectations on 
future industry growth. 
 
Notwithstanding the country’s notable achievements on renewable energy 
development to date, both the Chinese government and business face some difficult 
challenges ahead. We have only been able to touch upon those facing policy-makers 
in particular, namely grid connectivity problems and other infrastructural 
bottlenecks, establishing up-to-date technical standards, co-ordinating central and 
local government policy concerning regional RE business development, and 
establishing clearer demarcations of responsibility among various actors in different 
renewable energy systems. The government’s future targets on renewables 
development may look impressive in absolute terms (e.g. 430GW hydropower and 
200GW wind by 2020) by direct international comparison. However, given that the 
country’s energy system is growing fast on most fronts, the real challenge will be to 
raise renewables’ relative share of national energy generation and consumption. 
Many nations have set the goal of renewables contributing around 15 to 30 percent of 
the nation’s total electricity generation or total energy mix by 2020 (REN21 2013). 
China’s present targets on electricity generation from non-hydro renewables 
especially are not that remarkable by comparison. For Chinese business in the 
international market context, the two main challenges will be how to address the 
protectionism of foreign trade partners and to improve domestic techno-innovatory 
capacity. The first of these challenges will naturally depend largely on factors beyond 
Chinese company control, specifically how foreign firms and governments respond to 
the perceived competitive threats China’s RE industries pose. Regarding the second, 
with strong state support aimed at transforming the country into an ‘innovation hub’ 
economy – for example through the 12th Five Year Plan’s Strategic Emerging 
Industries programme – backed by considerable levels of domestic business 
investment, Chinese companies are already making significant advances on techno-
innovation in wind, solar and other RE sectors. This represents another area where 
China can make increasingly important contributions to global renewable energy 
development in the future. 
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